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I. INTRODUCTION

Novelist Jonathan Franzen has aptly described the right to privacy in
the United States as being "the Cheshire cat of values: not much substance,
but a very winning smile."1 In fact, an enforceable right to privacy, in the
contemporary American electronic workplace, has not yet materialized,
with or without a smile.
Despite the enormous technological transformation of the workplace
over the past three decades,2 the scope of workplace privacy protections
in the United States remains quite limited. This porosity of privacy in
American labor and employment law stems from the narrow scope of the

1. Jonathan Franzen, ImperialBedroom, in How To Be Alone: Essays, 39, 42 (2002).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 5 (2001).
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six primary sources of rights relevant to workplace privacy: (a) the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,3 which has been interpreted to grant
public sector employees a limited right to privacy;4 (b) federal statutes
containing privacy restrictions applicable to employment;' (c) state
constitutional right to privacy clauses; 6 (d) state privacy legislation; 7 (e)
state common law;8 and (f) negotiated provisions contained in collective
bargaining agreements.
In contrast to the common misperception, the U.S. Constitution "does
not explicitly mention any right of privacy." 9 Constitutionally based
privacy rights in the United States have been the result of judicial
interpretations of constitutional amendments that were ratified in 1789 and
1869.10 Many of those interpretations are subject to sustained criticisms

3. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
amend. IV.
4. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-17 (1987).
5. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552a (2008); Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 12112(d) (2008); Electronic Privacy Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510; 18 U.S.C. § 2701; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d2 (2008).
6. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6. Unlike other
states, California's constitutional right to privacy provision prohibits privacy intrusions by both
governmental and private actors. See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 644
(Cal. 1994).
7. An example of a relatively recent state privacy statute is the New York Labor Law
section 203-c, which prohibits both private and public employers from videotaping employees in
restrooms, locker rooms, or other rooms designated for undressing. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 203-c
(McKinney 2008). Other states have enacted statutes restricting, to a limited degree, employer
computer surveillance. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1997) (defining four
privacy torts: unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion; appropriation of the name or likeness of
another; unreasonable publicity given to private life; and publicity that unreasonably places another
in a false light). The common law in some states recognizes one or more of these privacy torts.
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
10. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,646-58 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
U.S. CONST.
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and continue to be regular subjects of questioning during Supreme Court
judicial confirmation hearings."
The American legal framework is narrow in stark contrast to the public
perception that privacy constitutes an enforceable and unbridled American
right. This misperception is greatest within the workplace, where
employees frequently assume that there are strict legal restrictions on
employer surveillance.
The American habit of relying on litigation, rather than legislation and
regulation, as a primary means for the development of a public policy
framework in certain areas ensures that American privacy law will not
keep pace with rapid technological advances occurring in the workplace.
Litigation provides only post-hoc resolution of complicated issues at the
crossroads of technology and labor law. Moreover, as two scholars have
noted "[t]he reactive, adaptive process adopted by the courts makes it
difficult to address digital privacy problems rationally or effectively."12
At the same time, legislative action is too frequently precipitated by
tragedy or other notorious events at the expense of sober, proactive, and
rational inquiry into a developing problem. A good example of such3
legislative over-exuberance is the Videotape Privacy Protection Act,'
which stemmed from the noxious release of video rental records of
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork. 4 While video rental privacy is
deserving of legislative attention, broader electronic workplace privacy
issues have received very little legislative attention in the past two
decades. The recent enactment of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)" is a prime exception to the
general lack of legislative initiative in the area of workplace privacy
issues.
One commentator has asserted that the current American privacy law
paradigm is reflective of a contemporary cultural preference for digital
conveniences over expectations of privacy.' 6 According to this
commentator, consumer and public embracement of new technologies may
mean the end to any privacy expectations. In a rapid response, Professor
Daniel J. Solove challenged those assertions, noting that an inherent caveat
11. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 110-15 (1990); STEPHEN
L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 54-61 (1994).
12. Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and
Canada:The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 361-62 (2005).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2008).
14. Consumer Privacy Guide.org, Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, http://www.
consumerprivacyguide.org/law/vppa.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
15. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
16. L. Gordon Crovitz, Privacy? We Got Over It, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2008, at All.
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underlying an individual providing electronic data to institutions, such as
banks, is that the institutions will treat the information confidentially. 7
This exchange is emblematic of an accelerating distance between
American law and societal expectations stemming from digital innovation.
While computer scientists work toward a construct enabling the
amalgamation of information from multiple technological sources to create
individual digital data trails,"8 there is little parallel work being done to
develop legal protocols and guidelines aimed at regulating the use of such
collective intelligence. Although analyses of merged digital information
about behavior in the workplace can lead to positive results, including
improved efficiencies, there remains a need for joint legal and
technological research projects aimed at developing prudent limitations on
the use of such accumulated collective intelligence. Without regulatory
and architectural checks, collective intelligence can be easily misused to
restrict and restrain individual and collective rights and expectations in the
workplace.
The limits ofAmerican electronic privacy protections were highlighted
almost a decade ago, when a European governmental entity concluded that
the "current [American] patchwork of narrowly-focused sectoral laws and
voluntary self-regulation cannot at present be relied upon to provide
adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the
European Union." 9 Although subsequent negotiations between the United
States and the European Union have established a safe harbor for
American companies to overcome the limitations of American privacy
law,2" the codification of electronic workplace privacy laws in the United
States has not materialized on the national or state level.2 '
For the past three decades, deregulation ideology has dominated most
public policy discussions in the United States, especially in the area of

17. See Daniel J. Solove, FallaciesAbout Privacy, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Aug. 25, 2008,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/08/fallaciesabout.html#more.
18. John Markoff, You're Leaving a Digital Trail,Should You Care?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/business/30privacy.html.
19. Opinion 1/99 ofthe Working Party Concerning the Level ofData Protection in the United
States and the Ongoing Discussions Between the European Commission and the U.S. Government,
at 2 WP (1999) 15 final (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/1 999/wp1 5en.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
20. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
21. At least two states, Delaware and Connecticut, have enacted laws requiring particular
employer notification to employees before conducting electronic monitoring. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 705 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2008).
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labor and employment law.22 This ideology, along with the decline in
union density, inherently delegates to employer self-regulation the task of
determining the proper balance between employer and employee interests.
While it is not uncommon for employers to respect employee privacy to
some degree for numerous business reasons, such voluntary employer
balancing results in few, if any, enforceable workplace rights.
23 the
In Guard Publishing Company d/b/a The Register-Guard,
National Labor Relations Board concluded that an employer's common
law personal property rights, with respect to its computer system, trumps
the statutory associational rights granted by the National Labor Relations
Act.24 The decision is one indication of the current American legal
landscape with respect to employee legal rights in an electronic workplace.
The severity of the current worldwide economic crisis, however, may
result in a public policy shift in favor of workplace privacy regulations. In
response to the consequences of the current recession, French President
Nicolas Sarkozy has stated: "Le laisser-faire, c'est fini."25
In contrast to the United States, the European Union and its Member
States, along with other industrialized countries such as Canada, have been
proactive in developing a substantive and procedural legal structure for
protecting individual and personal data privacy. 2' This proactive effort
stems from an alternative perspective that approaches privacy as
constituting a component of human dignity, rather than as an extension of
property rights.27
Within Europe, the scope and applicability of privacy rights emanate
from certain primary sources:28 the codification and regulation of
individual and data privacy under the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of
Personal Data; the European Privacy Directive and national legislation; the

22. See William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must
be Honest, 12 EMP. RTs. & POL'Y J.49, 55 (2008).
23. 351 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (2007).
24. Seeid. at9-10.
25. Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 2-14 (2009), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2009/l.htm.
26. See Export.gov, Welcome to the Safe Harbor, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
27. See Gail Lasprogata et al., Regulation of ElectronicEmployee Monitoring:Identifying
Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy through a Comparative Study of Data Privacy
Legislation in the EuropeanUnion, UnitedStates and Canada,2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 8-9
(2005).
28. See id.
at 9-14, 37-40.
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establishment of governmental agencies in each country with the power to
enforce privacy statutes and regulations; and the creation of an
international body, known as the Article 29 Working Party, to provide
analysis and guidance with respect to privacy issues.
This Article examines how the European Union, the United Kingdom,
France, and Canada have approached workplace privacy issues in response
to the advent of new workplace technologies. Where appropriate, this
Article will compare the approach abroad to the current state of American
labor and employment law. The presentation of alternative approaches,
however, should not be perceived as suggesting that one or more of these
approaches constitute some sort of legal panacea. Rather, the analyses and
proactive choices made by other jurisdictions provide alternatives worthy
of consideration in examining the proper balance of rights and interests in
the American electronic workplace.
This Article begins with an examination of the European sources of
law that establish individual and personal data privacy as fundamental
rights. It then turns to a discussion of relevant precedent from the
European Court of Human Rights, followed by an analysis of various
important opinions and working documents from the Article 29 Working
Party. The Article then examines the applicable law in the United
Kingdom, France, and Canada. Finally, the Article calls for a reevaluation
of American public policy through examination of the principles,
guidelines, and structures adopted in other industrialized countries.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FUNDAMENTAL EUROPEAN
PRIVACY PROVISIONS

A. Conventionfor the Protectionof Human Rights and
FundamentalRights
In April 1950, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights, commonly referred
to as ECHR.29 Since its adoption, ECHR has been amended multiple times

29. The Council of Europe is distinct and a much older European institution than the
European Union. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental entity formed in 1949 with a
current membership of 47 countries. For comparison, see Council of Europe and European Union,
http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/Documentation/LOEEU-en.asp (last visited Nov. 17,
2008). In contrast, the European Union has 27 Member States. The European Union has established
various international bodies including the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the
Council of the European Union. Id.
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and ratified by Member States. 30 ECHR grants broad privacy protections
in both the public and private sectors.
ECHR, Article 8, section 1 establishes privacy as a fundamental right:
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence."'" In certain circumstances, however, pursuant to
ECHR, Article 8, section 2, public entities are permitted to interfere with
an individual's rights, if it is in accordance with domestic law and such
interference is "necessary in a democratic society., 32 ECHR, Article 8,
section 2 states:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.33
Pursuant to Article 6, section 2 of the Treaty of the European Union,
the European Union and its Member3 4States are required to respect the
fundamental rights granted by ECHR.
Finally, ECHR establishes an international tribunal for the resolution
of alleged violations of such rights by Member States: the European Court
of Human Rights. 35 The European Court of Human Rights has issued a

number of significant decisions that have applied ECHR, Article 8, to
employer monitoring. 6

30. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DCI 3-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter ECHR].
31. Id. art. 8, § 1.
32. Id. art. 8,§2.
33. Id.
34. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty of the European Union and of the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct.
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340), availableathttp://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
C:2006:321E:0001:0331 :EN:PDF.
35. See ECHR, supra note 30, arts. 19-5 1.
36. See Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (1997); Copland v. United
Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 253 (2007).
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B. Conventionfor the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Automatic Processingof PersonalData
In January 198 1, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of
Personal Data37 (Personal Data Convention) aimed at protecting a right to
privacy with respect to the automatic processing of personal data. Chapter
II, Article 5, of the Personal Data Convention requires signatory countries
to modify their respective national laws consistent with the basic
principles of the Personal Data Convention. 8 These basic principles
require that the personal data be:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

obtained and processed fairly and lawfully;"
stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used
in a way incompatible with those purposes;40
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are stored;4'
42
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date;
preserved in a form which permits identification of the data
subjects for no longer than is
required for the purpose for
43
which those data are stored;
protected through appropriate security measures to avoid
accidental or authorized destruction, access, alteration or
distribution;'
accessible to the subject of the data to establish the
existence and general content of the automated personal
data file; 45 and
subject to rectification or erasure if the data was processed
contrary to the provisions of the national law enacted to

37. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, ETS No. 108, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
08.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Personal Data Convention].
38. See id. ch. II, art. 4.
39. Id. ch. II, art. 5.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Personal Data Convention, supra note 37, art. 5.
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 7.
45. Id. art. 8.
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give effect to the basic principles of the Personal Data
Convention.46
In addition, the Personal Data Convention contains restrictions on the
gathering of personal data that reveals racial origin, political opinions,
religious and other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or
sexual life and criminal convictions.47 Automatic data collection with
respect to these topics is prohibited unless a subject country has enacted
a domestic law that provides sufficient safeguards.48
C. The 1995 EuropeanPrivacy Directive
In 1995, the European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union issued Directive 95/46/EC (Privacy Directive). 49 A central purpose
of the Privacy Directive is to ensure that Member States protect an
individual's "right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal
data."5 An equally important objective of the Privacy Directive is to
promote legal uniformity among Member States with respect to personal
data to ensure a free flow of such data.5 1
1. Substantive Scope of the Privacy Directive
The broad scope of the information protected under the Privacy
Directive is demonstrated by the definition of the phrase "personal data":
"any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity."52
The Privacy Directive imposes numerous obligations on Member
States, including the requirement that each country enact or modify
national legislation consistent with the Privacy Directive's uniform

46. Id.
47. See Personal Data Convention, supra note 37, art. 6.
48. See id.
49. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such
Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 [hereinafter Privacy Directive]. An unofficial version of the Privacy
Directive is available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EUDirective_.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2008).
50. Id. art. 1, § 1.
51. Id. art. 1.
52. Id. art. 2(a).
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principles and criteria.53 When a Member State enacts or modifies national
legislation, the Privacy Directive mandates specific criteria to be followed
by that Member State. Compliance with the criteria is necessary to ensure
that data processing will be deemed legitimate.54 The criteria require that:
A.
B.

C.
D.
E.

F.

the data subject has unambiguously given his or her
consent; or
[the] processing is necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is a party or in order to
take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering
into a contract; or
[the] processing is necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject; or
the processing is necessary in order to protect the vital
interests of the data subject; or
[the] processing is necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of
official authority vested in the controller or in a third party
to whom the data are disclosed; or
[the] processing is necessary for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by third
party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except
where such interests are overridden by the interests for
fundamental rights of the data subject. .. "

Every individual subject to personal data collection is guaranteed,
under the Privacy Directive, the right to receive confirmation whether his
or her personal information is being processed; the purposes of the
processing; the categories of the information concerned; and the recipients
to whom the information is to be disclosed.56 In addition, a data subject is
entitled to receive in an "intelligible form" the information being
processed, along with the rationale underlying any automatic processing. 7
Furthermore, an individual who is the subject of data collection is entitled
to object to the processing in particular circumstances.58

53. Id. arts. 5, 6 & 7.
54. See Privacy Directive, supra note 49, art. 7.

55. Id. art. 7(a)-(f).
56. See id. art. 12.
57. See id.
58. See id. art. 14.
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In general, the processing of personal information that can reveal the
race, ethnicity, religion, political opinions, philosophical beliefs, union
membership, health, and sex life is prohibited. 59 This general prohibition
is subject to a number of exceptions, including two that are readily
applicable to the workplace: when explicit individual consent has been
provided by the employee subject to the data collection; and when the data
processing is necessary to carry out the employer's legal obligations, so
long as it is authorized by national legislation and includes adequate
safeguards. 6°
2. The Establishment of Supervisory Authorities in Member States
In addition to its substantive mandates, the Privacy Directive, Article
28, requires each Member State to establish an independent governmental
entity, known as a supervisory authority, to ensure compliance with the
national legislation enacted consistent with the Privacy Directive. 6' These
supervisory authorities have procedural similarities to many federal and
state administrative agencies in the United States. Article 28 of the Privacy
Directive mandates that each supervisory authority be granted the
following administrative responsibilities and duties:
A.

To hear and resolve claims alleging a violation of the rights
and freedoms with respect to the processing of personal
information;
Investigative powers including the power to access the data
at issue and to collect information necessary to engage in
supervisory duties;
To issue opinions with respect to the handling of data as
well as the power to order the blocking, erasure or
destruction of data; and
To commence legal proceedings seeking to enforce
national provisions adopted pursuant to the Privacy
Directive;
To prepare regular reports regarding their activities.62

B.
C.
D.
E.

The establishment of national bodies under Article 28 is an important
component of the European Union's proactive approach to privacy issues.

59.
60.
61.
62.

See
See
See
See

Privacy Directive, supra note 49, art. 8, § 1.
id. art. 8, § 2(a) & (b).
id. art. 28.
id.
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Each country's supervising authority issues opinions and guidelines that
can assist organizations and individuals in complying with the applicable
privacy legislation.63
3. The Article 29 Working Party
In addition to mandating the creation of an independent national
administrative body in each Member State, the Privacy Directive also
creates an independent advisory body known as the Working Party on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
(Article 29 Working Party).' The Article 29 Working Party is composed
of representatives from the supervising authority of each European Union
Member State.65
The responsibilities of the Article 29 Working Party are set forth in the
Privacy Directive.66 They include examining national data privacy
legislation in Member States to ensure uniformity; examining the national
data privacy laws of third-party countries, such as the United States; and
issuing opinions and recommendations on issues related to personal
electronic privacy.6 7 Since its creation, the Article 29 Working Party has
issued a number of significant advisory opinions relevant to the workplace
which will be discussed in Part IV, infra.6 8
4. Safe Harbor Framework for Transfer of Personal Data to and
From the United States
Article 25 of the Privacy Directive permits the transfer of personal
information to a third country, outside the European Union, only if the
third country ensures an adequate level of data privacy protection.69 When
it is determined that a third country,7" lacks adequate legal protections, the
Privacy Directive directs that negotiations take place to remedy those
inadequacies.

63. See id.
64. Privacy Directive, supra note 49, art. 29. The website for the Article 29 Working Party
is http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/index-en.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2008).
65. See id.
66. Id. art. 30(1).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., supra note 19 and accompanying text; see infra notes 148, 154, 195 and
accompanying text.
69. Privacy Directive, supra note 49, art. 25.
70. See id.
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In 2000, the European Union and U.S. Commerce Department reached
an agreement for a "safe harbor" framework aimed at permitting data
transfers from European Union Member States to the United States.7 As
part of the agreement, the U.S. Commerce Department issued seven
voluntary safe harbor privacy principles applicable to the handling of
personal data to qualify for safe harbor status: notice, choice, onward
transfer, security, data integrity, access, and enforcement.72
These voluntary principles' aim to establish an adequate privacy
framework to permit American companies to receive personal data
originating from an European Union Member State.73 However, the
principles are not applicable to information gathered and processed
initially within the United States.74
The safe harbor notice principle mandates that an organization provide
an individual with initial notice that includes: the purpose for the data
collection and how the information will be used; the applicable complaint
procedure; the types of third parties to which the information may be
disclosed; and the choices and means offered for limiting the use and
disclosure of the information.75
With respect to consent, an organization under the privacy principles
must grant individuals the opportunity to opt out of having personal data
disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose inconsistent with the initial
notice. 76 However, for data related to medical or health conditions, racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or
union membership, explicit consent must be obtained before the
information is disclosed to a third party or used for an unauthorized
purpose.77
In addition, individuals must be allowed access to their personal data
and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information where it is
inaccurate, except where the burden or expense for such access would be
disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy or where the rights
of persons other than the individual would be violated.78

71. See Export.gov, Safe Harbor Documents, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_
Documents.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
72. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, July 21, 2000,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPrivacy.asp [hereinafter Privacy Principles].
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Privacy Principles, supra note 72.
78. See id.
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Under the safe harbor principles, there must be an adequate mechanism
created to assure compliance with the principles including a complaint
procedure and consequences when the principles are not followed.7 9 At a
minimum, such mechanisms must include: (a) an available, affordable, and
independent process to hear and resolve individual complaints and
disputes; (b) follow up procedures for verifying that the assertions about
a privacy practice are true and that the privacy practice has been
implemented as presented; and (c) an ability to remedy problems arising
out of a failure to comply with the principles by organizations announcing
their adherence to them and consequences for such organizations.8"
5. 2002 Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
In July 2002, the European Parliament and the Council of the
European Union supplemented the Privacy Directive with Directive
2002/58/EC (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 8 1
which applies the criteria of the Privacy Directive to personal data
transmitted through a publicly available electronic communications
service.82 The Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
requires Member States to enact laws requiring Internet service providers
to utilize appropriate security safeguards on their services and to ensure
the confidentiality of the communications.83
In addition, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
places strict limitations on the collection of location data, other than traffic
data, from cell phones and other portable electronic devices.84 These
limitations include requiring either anonymity with respect to location data
or consent by the user or subscriber, which can be withdrawn at any time.85
Before obtaining consent, the service provider is required to inform the
user or subscriber of the type of location data that will be processed, the
purpose and duration of the
processing, and whether the data will be
86
transmitted to a third party.

79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, Council Directive 2002/58, 2002
O.J. (L201) 37, 38 (EC), availableathttp://mineco.fgov.be/internetobservatory/pdf/ [hereinafter
Directive on Privacy & Electronic Communication].
82. See id.

83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. arts. 4 & 5.
See id.
art. 9.
See id.
See Directive on Privacy & Electronic Communication, supra note 81.
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6. European Commission Staff Working Document: Early Challenges
Regarding the "Internet of Things"
In late 2008, the European Commission initiated a public dialogue with
respect to the implications of the eventual integration of data from radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology into an Internet based
'
amalgamation of electronic data known as the "Internet of Things."87
In a draft Commission Staff Working Document entitled "Early
Challenges regarding the 'Internet of Things,'".. privacy, data protection,
and security were cited as some of the public policy challenges resulting
from the development and application of RFID technology. After the
European Commission has received and studied comments responding to
the working document, it intends to issue a Commission Communication
to the European Parliament on the Internet of Things in 2009. In
recognition of the regulatory challenges that result from the speed of
technological innovation, the draft document recommends the
development of privacy and security friendly RFID architecture as an
initial step prior to consideration of additional regulation.8 9 The European
Commission's examination of the privacy implications of RFID
technology comes at the same time as scholars continue to express
concerns about the potential adverse impact that RFID technology may
have on human rights.9"

87. As will be seen in Part VI.D. infra, the Article 29 Working Party addressed the privacy

implications of RFID technology in the workplace in a 2005 opinion. In addition, the European
Commission, in 2007, issued a Communication to the European Parliament, entitled "Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps towards a policy framework" with respect to

public policy issues stemming from RFID technology. The Communication is available at
http://www.iot-visitthefuture.eu/fileadmin/documents/roleofeuropeancommision/Communication_
onRFID European Commission 2007.pdf.

88. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic

and Social

Committee

and the

Committee

of the

Regions,

available at

http://ec.europa.eu/information society/policy/rfid/documents/earlychallengeslOT.pdf.
89. Id.at 8.
90. RFID Chips: A Privacy and Security Pandora's Box?, SC1. DAILY, Nov. 28, 2008,

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/11/081118141854.htm (discussing a recent article by
Eleni Kosta and Jos Dumortier from the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and Information &
Communication Technology at the Katholieke Universiteit in Belgium published in the
International Journal of Intellectual Property Management about the potential adverse impact on
privacy resulting from the implementation of RFID technology).
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D. The CharterofFundamentalRights
In December 2000, the leaders of the European Parliament, the
Council of Europe, and the European Commission signed, and proclaimed
the Charter of Fundamental Rights91 (Charter). The Charter guarantees, as
fundamental rights, the right to privacy and a right of protection for
personal data.92 The Charter was inspired by the ECHR and contains

similar, but not identical, provisions with respect to privacy. Pursuant to
Article 52 of the Charter, the rights granted by the Charter, which
correspond with rights guaranteed by the ECHR, are to be interpreted
consistent with the ECHR. 93

Article 7 of the Charter provides: "Everyone has the right to respect for
his or her private and family life, home and communications."94 Article 7
utilizes the identical wording contained in ECHR, Article 8, section 1, but
substitutes the term "correspondence" with the broader term
"communications" reflecting the significant growth in electronic
documents.95
Like the Privacy Directive, the Charter contains explicit privacy
protections for personal data and mandates that each country establish a
governmental body with the authority to enforce those protections.96
Article 8 of the Charter states:
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 97
Although the Charter grants countries permission to establish
exceptions to the rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8, such exceptions
are subject to strict scrutiny.98 Pursuant to Article 52, these national
exceptions must be provided by law and must respect the essence of those

91. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 200/C, 2000 O.J. (C364) 1 (EC),
availableat http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text en.pdf [hereinafter EU Charter].
92. See id. at 10.
93. See id. at 21.
94. Id. at 10.
95. Compare id., with supra note 30 and accompanying text.
96. See EU Charter, supra note 91, at 10.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 21.
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rights. 99 Moreover, such exceptions are subject to the principle of
proportionality and codified limitations may be applied "only if they are
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by
' °°
the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.'
The combination of the ECHR, the Privacy Directive, and the Charter
establish a firm foundation for the protection of employee privacy in the
workplace in Europe. This Article turns next to relevant decisions issued
by the European Court of Human Rights interpreting the ECHR.

III. RELEVANT DECISIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Court of Human Rights has issued a series of decisions
interpreting the scope ofprivacy protections under ECHR, Article 8. These
decisions constitute important precedent in the development of European
privacy law under the Privacy Directive and in litigation under privacy
provisions contained in national legislation.
The scope of ECHR, Article 8 privacy protections is illustrated by a
decision from the European Court of Human Rights in a privacy claim
brought by a private German attorney, finding that his privacy rights were
violated when the local police searched his law office consistent with an
order issued by a Munich judge.'
In Niemietz v. Germany, °2 a local judge received a letter signed with
a pseudonym on behalf of an anti-clerical group affiliated with a political
party.0 3 The letter criticized a pending criminal prosecution of a private
employer for refusing to deduct a Church tax from the wages of his
employees."° In addition, the letter accused the presiding judge of being
both biased and incompetent.'0 5 The resultant criminal investigation into
the insulting letter led the German police to obtain a court order directing
a search of Niemietz's office as part of an effort by the police to learn the
identity of the letter writer.0 6 Niemietz was targeted for the search based
upon his known affiliation with both the anti-clerical group and the related

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
Id.
See Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1992).
16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1992).
See id. 7.
See id.
See id.
See id. 9-10.
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political party. °7 In November 1986, the police conducted a search of
Niemietz's law office, pursuant to the court order,0 8including examining his
client's files, but found no relevant documents.1
Niemietz challenged the search under ECHR, Article 8, Section 1 and
it was ultimately heard by the European Court of Human Rights. °9 In
sustaining Niemietz's Article 8 arguments, the court made a number of
important findings underscoring the scope of ECHR privacy protections. 110
First, the court rejected Germany's argument that the search of a
private law office is not covered under Article 8. "' Germany claimed that
Article 8 only prohibits interference in "private and family life," and
"home and correspondence.""' 2 Although the court found that the search
interfered with the attorney's private life, it acknowledged a difficulty in
articulating a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a "private life"
under ECHR, Article 8.1" Nevertheless, the court recognized that, in
general, the protection of "private life" must include, to some degree,11a4
"right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings."''
Furthermore, it concluded that an exclusion of professional or business
activities from the definition of "personal life" is inconsistent with two
practical realities: (a) professional and business activities play a major part
in developing personal relationships; and (b) it is very difficult to draw
distinctions between an individual's personal activities and professional or
business life." 5

107. See Niemietz, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8.
108. See id. 11.
109. See id.7 23-25.
110. See id
111. Seeid. 27,29.
112. Niemietz, 16 Cur. Ct. H.R. IN26-29.
113. Id. 29.
114. Id.
115. See id. When the Article 29 Working Party prepared Opinion 8/2001 on the processing
of personal data in the workplace, it relied on the following quote from ECHR:
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish
and develop relationships with other human beings. There appears, furthermore,
to be no reason of principle why this understanding of the notion of "private life"
should be taken to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it
is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of people have
a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the
outside world. This view is supported by the fact that, as was rightly pointed out
by the Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an
individual's activities form part of his professional or business life and which do
not.
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The court also found that the search interfered with Niemietz's
"home." '16 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that various
Member States, including Germany, treated business premises as a home
for purposes of Article 8. 7 In addition, the Court cited to the fact that:
In this context also, it may not always be possible to draw precise
distinctions, since activities which are related to a profession or
business may well be conducted from a person's private residence
may well be carried on in an
and activities which are not so related
8
office or commercial premises."
After concluding that the search interfered with rights guaranteed by
Article 8, section 1, the court then examined whether the interference was
permissible under Article 8, section 2.' 19 In perhaps the most significant
portion of the decision, the court concluded that the search conducted
pursuant to ajudicially ordered subpoena constituted interference that was
not "necessary in a democratic society."' 20 This conclusion was premised
on the overly broad scope of the subpoena in comparison to the purpose
2
of the search of the law office: learning the identity of the letter writer.' '
Under the circumstances, the court found that the search of the law office
was disproportionate to its purpose because it involved the encroachment
into professional secrecy and the potential interference in the
administration of justice.'22
The application of the principle of proportionality in Niemietz and
under the Privacy Directive, in determining whether there has been a
privacy violation, has not been explicitly adopted in American
jurisprudence. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that when
determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth
Amendment, 2 a court must apply a balancing test that will "consider the
scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted."' 24

Opinion of Working Party, at 7, WP (2001) 48 final (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/document?ID=l 365969 (quoting ECHR,supranote 30, 29).
31, 33.
116. SeeNiemietz, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R.
117. See id. 30.
118. See id.
119. See id. 36.
99 36-38.
120. See id.
36-38.
121. See Niemietz, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R.
122. See id.
$ 37.
123. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
124. See id.
at 998.
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In S. andMarperv. the UnitedKingdom,'25 the court recently held that
the United Kingdom violated Article 8 by refusing a request, by two
British nationals, for the destruction of their cellular samples, DNA
profiles and fingerprints after criminal charges against them had been
discontinued. The court concluded that:
the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of
the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons
suspected but not convicted of offenses, as applied in the case of
the present applicants, fails to strike a fair balance between
competing public and private interests and that the respondent
State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this
regard. Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a
disproportionate interference with the applications' right to respect
for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a
democratic society.'26
The court's conclusion with respect to the retention of cellular samples
is premised upon its recognition that such samples contain highly sensitive
personal information about an individual's health. In many ways, the
ruling is consistent with the public policy underlying the enactment of
GINA in the United States. With respect to the court's ruling on the
retention of DNA samples, the Ninth Circuit has 27indicated a somewhat
similar conclusion under the Fourth Amendment.
In 1997, the European Court of Human Rights examined the
application of ECHR, Article 8, to employee workplace privacy. In
Ha/fordv. UnitedKingdom, 128 the court ruled in favor of a privacy claim
brought pursuant to Article 8 by Alison Halford, a female Assistant Chief
Constable employed in the Merseyside Police Authority. 129 Halford, the
most senior ranking female police officer in the United Kingdom, filed a
gender discrimination claim after her eighth application for a promotion
to Deputy Chief Constable within the Merseyside police was rejected. 30
In response to the filing of her discrimination claim, she was subjected to

125. [2008] ECHR 1581, availableat http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581 .html.
126. Id. 125.
127. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 835-36 n.31 (9th Cir. 2004).
128. See id. n.35. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights' ruling with respect to the
expungement ofthe fingerprints is inconsistent with U.S. precedent. See United States v. Schnitzer,
567 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1977).
129. 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 9.
130. Id. 9-10.
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various retaliatory acts which included disciplinary measures and the
interception of telephone calls for the purpose of gathering negative
13
" ' Ultimately, Halford's
information about her discrimination claim.
32
resolved.1
was
claim
gender discrimination
Thereafter, Halford commenced a claim under ECHR, Article 8,
alleging that her privacy rights were violated when her office and home
telephone calls were intercepted.33 After examining the evidence, the
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish that there
was a "reasonable likelihood" that Halford's office telephone calls had
been intercepted, but the court reached a different conclusion with respect
to her home telephone calls. 34 It then proceeded to examine whether the
surveillance of Halford's workplace telephone calls violated Article 8.135
' One phone
Halford worked in a private office with two telephones. 36
was designated for her own private use and was connected to the police's
internal telephone network. 137 The department did not place any
restrictions on her use of the telephones and Halford3 8was granted explicit
permission to work on her case during work hours.
Like Germany's unsuccessful argument in the Niemietz case, the
United Kingdom asserted that Halford's telephone calls did not constitute
"private life" and "correspondence" under ECHR, Article 8, section 1.139
The court rejected this argument, citing earlier precedent holding that
telephone calls from a business premises can fall under the rubrics of
"private life" and "correspondence" under Article 8.140 The court also
rejected the argument that Halford lacked a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in her workplace.' 4 ' In reaching its decision, the court considered
that Halford had not received a warning that her calls were subject to
interception; that the two office telephones were for her sole use, with one
specifically designated for private calls; and that she had been given
assurances that she 42could utilize her office telephones for her
discrimination claim. 1

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. T 12.
Id. T$ 13-15.
Halford,24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41.
Id. 17.
Id. 946.
Id. 916.
Id.
Halford,24 Eur. Ct. H.R. T 16.
Id. T 43.
Id. 944.
Id. T 45.
Id.
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The court's adoption and application of the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard in Halford suggests that the court borrowed a privacy
standard from U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the area of workplace
privacy. In O'Connor v. Ortega,143 the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
same standard in determining whether the search of a public employee's
office violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Like the
court in Halford,the U.S. Supreme Court in O'Connorconcluded that the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in portions of his office
desk and file cabinet because the employer had failed to establish a policy
or practice that discouraged employees from utilizing the workplace for
personal purposes.'"
Privacy decisions under ECHR are also impacting decisions by the
145
U.S. Supreme Court. For example, the majority in Lawrence v. Texas
held that a Texas sodomy statute was unconstitutional because it infringed
on the right to engage in intimate sexual conduct in one's home, citing to
various European Court of Human Rights opinions that had declined to
follow an earlier contrary U.S. Supreme Court decision.'46 However,
reliance on international law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution remains
the subject of a spirited debate. For example, in Lawrence, Justice Scalia
criticized the majority's reliance on the law of foreign nations in
determining constitutional rights.'4 7
In 2002, the Article 29 Working Group issued a working document
with respect to workplace privacy interpreting Halford,Niemtiz, and other
judicial precedent as recognizing the following principles under ECHR,
Article 8:
(a)

(b)

Workers have a legitimate expectation of privacy at the
workplace, which is not overridden by the fact that workers
use communication devices or any other business facilities
of the employer. However, the provision of proper
information by the employer to the worker may reduce the
workers [sic] legitimate expectation of privacy.
The general principle of secrecy of correspondence
covers communications at the workplace. This is
likely to include electronic email related files and
attached thereto.

143. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
144. Id. at 719.

145. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
146. Id. at 576 (majority opinion).
147. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Respect for private life also includes to a certain
degree the right to establish and develop
relationship with other human beings. The fact that
such relationships, to a great extent, take place at
the workplace puts limits to employer's legitimate
need for surveillance measures.' 48

In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights was called upon to
determine whether an employer's surveillance of workplace e-mail and
Internet usage constituted a violation of ECHR, Article 8. In Coplandv.
United Kingdom, 49 the court held that the United Kingdom violated an
employee's Article 8 rights by engaging in surveillance of the employee's
use of workplace e-mail, the Internet, and telephone.150 Relying on
Halford, the court concluded that the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her e-mail, Internet, and telephone use because
she had not been given a warning that such usage was subject to
monitoring. 51 Furthermore, the court found that the interference was not
"in accordance with the law" pursuant to ECHR, Article 8, section 2. I"2
In dicta, however, the court indicated that under certain factual
circumstances, it may find that the surveillance of an employee's use of email, Internet, or telephone at the place of work is "necessary in a
democratic society," where the surveillance is in pursuit of a legitimate
aim. 153
As noted supra the Article 29 Working Party will follow precedent
interpreting ECHR provisions when examining workplace privacy issues
under the Privacy Directive. The article next turns to those opinions and
working documents by the Article 29 Working Party which provide
relevant guidance with respect to electronic privacy in the workplace.

148. Article 29-Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on the Surveillance of
Electronic Communications in the Workplace 9-10 (2002), availableathttp://ec.europa.eu/j ustice_
home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp55_en.pdf [hereinafter Article 29 Working Party 2002
document]. For an analysis of U.S. law with respect to surveillance of electronic communications
in the workplace, see William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You
Must be Honest 12 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 49 (2008).
149. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 253 (2007).
150. Id. 44.
151. Id. 41-42.
152. Id. 48.
153. Id.
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IV. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY OPINIONS AND
WORKING DOCUMENTS

Since its establishment, the Article 29 Working Party has played an
instrumental international role in examining the privacy implications of
new technologies through its issuance of opinions and working documents.
A. Opinion on the ProcessingofPersonalData in Employment
On September 13, 2001, the Article 29 Working Party issued Opinion
8/2001 dealing with the applicability of the Privacy Directive to the
processing of personal information in the employment context.'54 The
opinion provides significant guidance relating to employer handling of
personal employee data.'55
The Article 29 Working Party opinion articulates fundamental
principles applicable to workplace data protections in Member States.156
The opinion imposes a balanced approach to the interests of employers and
employees with respect to the issue of workplace privacy. This balance
stems from the European view that privacy is a component of human
dignity, rather than a legal concept shaped by property law and rights.
As part of its introduction to the fundamental principles, the Article 29
Working Party described the central premises of those principles:
Workers do not leave their right to privacy at the door of their
workplace every morning. However, privacy is not an absolute
right. It needs to be balanced with other legitimate interests or
rights or freedoms. This also applies to the employment context.
Workers, as long as they form part of an organization, have to
accept a certain degree of intrusion in their privacy and they must
share certain personal information with the employer. The
employer has a legitimate interest in processing personal data of
his workers for lawful and legitimate purposes that are necessary
for the normal development of the employment relationship and
the business operation.'57

154. Article 29-Working Party, Opinion 8/2001 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf [hereinafter Opinion
8/2001].
155. See generally id.
156. See generally id.
157. Id. at 19.
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Within the context of these central premises, the opinion articulates
seven principles applicable to the employment context under the Privacy
Directive: finality; transparency; legitimacy; proportionality; accuracy and
retention of the data; security; and awareness of staff.158 The three most
significant principles articulated in the opinion are finality, transparency,
and proportionality.
Finality requires that an employer utilize the data only for a specified,
explicit, and legitimate purpose.'59 Transparency requires that each
employee be properly informed about what data is being collected, the
purpose of the data collection, and be permitted access to his or her
16
personal data pursuant to Article 12 of the Privacy Directive.
Proportionality requires that an employer gather and distribute the
information through the least intrusive means by ensuring that the
information collected is adequate, 161
relevant, and not in excess of the
purposes for which it was gathered.
Opinion 8/2001 explicitly found the Privacy Directive's principles and
limitations to be fully applicable to employer workplace monitoring and
surveillance of e-mail and Internet use, employee location, employer video
surveillance, and the processing of sound and image data in
employment. 162 Such monitoring must constitute a proportionate employer
response to risks that it faces, taking into account legitimate employee
privacy needs. 163 The information collected during the course of the
monitoring must be adequate, relevant, and not in excess of the purposes
justifying the monitoring. " Consistent with transparency, employees must
be informed of the existence of the surveillance, as well as the purposes
for which the personal data is being processed.'65
In general, employee consent is not necessary in the employment
context as long as other requirements of the Privacy Directive are
satisfied. 66 However, explicit employee consent is required when
processing sensitive data that reveals an employee's race, ethnicity,
religion, political opinions, philosophical beliefs, union membership,
health, or sex life. 167
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 3-4.
Opinion 8/2001, supra note 154, at 3-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 4.
Opinion 8/2001, supra note 154, at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 16-17.
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In defining what constitutes legitimate employee consent, the Article
29 Working Party applies a standard requiring employee free choice.'68
Unlike the United States, where an employer may impose consent as a precondition to employment, the Article 29 Working Party concluded that if
an employer makes it impossible for an employee to refuse, it does not
constitute consent.'69 The opinion expressly states:
The Article 29 Working Party takes the view that where as a
necessary and unavoidable consequence of the employment
relationship an employer has to process personal data it is
misleading if it seeks to legitimise this processing through consent.
Reliance on consent should be confined to cases where the worker
has a genuine free choice and is subsequently able to withdraw the
consent without detriment. 7 °
B. Working Document on Surveillance of Workplace
Electronic Communications
In May 2002, the Article 29 Working Party issued a working
document, providing guidance as to the scope of permissible surveillance
of workplace electronic communications. 17' The working document
supplements Opinion 8/2001 with respect to workplace electronic
surveillance and continues the balanced approach espoused by that
opinion. It recommends various steps aimed at avoiding encroachment into
the privacy of personal e-mail and Internet use by suggesting that
employers offer employees private e-mail accounts and use blocking
72
software to stop employees from accessing non-work related web sites. 1
In drafting the guidelines, the Article 29 Working Party subgroup
examined precedent interpreting ECHR, Article 8, including Halford v.
UnitedKingdom,173 as well as other international legal documents relating
to privacy. The document concludes that electronic communications
utilizing an employer's property are covered by the notions of a "private
life" and "correspondence" under ECHR, Article 8.174
The working document guidelines set forth the general principles
applicable to employer surveillance of employee e-mail and Internet use:
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 3, 23.
Opinion 8/2001, supra note 154, at 23.
Id. at 24.
Article 29 Working Party 2002 document, supra note 148.
See generally id
See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
Article 29 Working Party 2002 document, supra note 148, at 10.
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(a) necessity; (b) finality; (c) transparency, including notifying the subject
of the surveillance; (d) notifying the supervisory authority before carrying
out automatic surveillance; (e) providing employee access to the fruit of
the surveillance; (f) legitimacy; (g) proportionality; (h) accuracy and
retention of the data; (i) security; and (j) awareness of staff. 7 '
Under the necessity principle, before engaging in e-mail and Internet
monitoring, an employer is obligated to determine that electronic
surveillance is "absolutely necessary," after it has examined other less
intrusive traditional means of supervision, and determined that they are
inadequate.' 76 Only in "exceptional circumstances," will electronic
surveillance be considered necessary.'
Examples of "exceptional
circumstances" include when an employer has a suspicion that an
employee is engaging in criminal activity or when the monitoring is aimed
at detecting computer viruses.'78
Consistent with the transparency principle, an employer must be open
and notorious when it comes to electronic surveillance. 7 9 Covert e-mail
monitoring is explicitly prohibited unless permitted by a Member State's
law in accordance with the Privacy Directive, such as where specific
criminal activity has been identified. 8 °
The transparency principle requires an employer to provide employees
with an accessible, clear, and accurate statement of the policy regarding
e-mail and Internet monitoring.' This statement should set forth the
employer's computer use policy with respect to employee personal or
private communications, the specific reasons and purposes for any
surveillance, the details of the surveillance measures, and the employer's
enforcement procedures when the employer believes that an employee has
violated the computer use policy.'82
The transparency guidelines further recommend that employers, as a
matter of practice, inform or consult with appropriate union
representatives before imposing a computer use policy."8 3 The guidelines
note that collective bargaining can be a useful means in the development

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 13-19.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Article 29 Working Party 2002 document, supra note 148, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
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in any electronic
of a computer use policy that assures proportionality
84
1
necessary.
absolutely
be
may
that
monitoring
The proportionality principle requires that the surveillance be
'
adequate, relevant, and not excessive in achieving the specified purpose. 85
The surveillance under a computer use policy must be narrowly applied to
meet the degree and type of risk facing the company. Therefore, blanket
employer monitoring of individual e-mails and Internet wandering, other
than when necessary for the system's security, is prohibited.
The Article 29 Working Party encourages, in the context of
proportionality, that e-mail monitoring be limited to keeping track of the
time and participants to an e-mail, rather than e-mail content. 86 If access
to e-mail content is absolutely necessary, employers should take necessary
steps to protect the privacy of the communication outside the organization.
C. Working Document on Biometrics
On August 1, 2003, the Article 29 Working Party issued a working
document on biometrics.' 87 Biometrics is an identification technology that
examines unique physical characteristics of an individual, such as a
fingerprint image, hand or facial geometrics, verbal communication, or iris
characteristics. 8 The Article 29 Working Party takes the position that
most biometric data is subject to the data protection principles set forth in
the Privacy Directive. " 9 For access control purposes, it favors the use of
biometric systems that use physical characteristics which do not leave
traces, such as the shape of a hand, as opposed to fingerprints. 9°
In discussing the applicability of the Privacy Directive's principles to
biometric information, the Article 29 Working Party concludes that such
data can be used only as long as there has been a strict assessment of the
necessity and proportionality for use of biometric data. 9 For example, if
biometric information is being processed for the purpose of controlling

184. Article 29 Working Party 2002 document, supra note 148, at 15.
185. Id. at 17.
186. Id. at 18-19.
187. Article 29-Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Biometrics, available
at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/feb/biometric-wp80_en.pdf [hereinafter Article 29
Working Party 2003 document].
188. See generally William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with
Human Tracking Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 1/S J.L. &
POL'Y 409, 412 n.9 (2006) [hereinafter Herbert, No DirectionHome].
189. Article 29 Working Party 2003 document, supra note 187, at 5.
190. Id. at6.
191. Id. at 6-7.
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access to a worksite, the use of the same data to analyze an employee's
emotional state would be inconsistent with its original purpose.l'9 Notably,
the document cites to a decision by Portugal's supervising authority
prohibiting a university from using a biometric
fingerprint system to
193
control and monitor staff time and attendance.
D. Opinion on the Use of Employee Location Data
In November 2005, the Article 29 Working Party issued an opinion
applying the Privacy Directive principles to the collection of employee
location data by an employer utilizing new technologies, such as a global
positioning system (GPS), 19 4 RFID, 95 and cell phones. 96 This conclusion
is equally applicable to location data of an individual employee and the
location of an assigned vehicle or portable location device.' 97 Therefore,
the principles of finality, transparency, legitimacy, proportionality,
accuracy and retention of data, security and awareness of staff are all
applicable to employee location data.
The Article 29 Working Party identified two primary issues with
respect to employer use of human tracking technologies: the illusive line
between work and private life and the degree of monitoring and
surveillance that is acceptable. 198 The opinion concludes that the
processing of location data of employees must correspond to a specific
employer need. 99 One example of a specific need is when the location
data is gathered in conjunction with the transportation of people or goods

192. Id. at 7.
193. See BIOMETRICS IN EUROPE, TREND REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/TrendReport_2006.pdf (prepared by the European
Biometrics Portal) (providing a comprehensive discussion about the use of biometrics in the
European Union).
194. See generallyHerbert, No DirectionHome, supranote 188, at 411 n.6. GPS is a satellite
based location tracking technology which can provide an employer with precise real time location
data of an employee and employer-owned property through a GPS receiver installed in a hand-held
device or attached to a vehicle.
195. See generally id. at 412 n.7. RFID is a radio-based identification system that uses tags
or cards containing microchips that can be read and thereby track the movement of an object or
individual. Id.
196. See Article 29-Working Party Opinion on the Use of Location Data With a View to
Providing Value Added Services 9 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wpl 15_en.pdf [hereinafter Article 29 Working Party 2005 document].
197. Id. at 10.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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or is aimed at improving the distribution of resources.2"' In contrast, the
gathering of location data would be deemed excessive in situations where
an employee is free to organize his or her own travel arrangements or
where the monitoring can be accomplished through less intrusive means.2 1
Further, the opinion emphasizes that it would be inappropriate for an
employer to collect location data for periods when an employee is not
working and recommends that all vehicles with tracking equipment should
enable an employee to switch off the location function. °2
The scope of location privacy protections, under the Article 29
Working Party opinion, is much greater than that provided by the current
laws in the United States.20 3 With the exception of states that have
outlawed mandatory implants containing location tracking technologies,
there are few legal restrictions in the United States relating to employee
location privacy.2° In Wisconsin, it is a criminal offense to mandate that
someone undergo the implant of a microchip; 2 5 similarly, North Dakota
has codified a criminal prohibition against mandatory RFID implants.20 6
Nevertheless, the substantive narrowness of these prohibitions is striking
when they are compared to the principles outlined in the Article 29
Working Party's Opinion on the Use of Employee Location Data.20 7
This Article next turns to legal developments in the United Kingdom,
France, and Canada in the area of workplace privacy. Each country has
enacted or modified legislation to meet its Privacy Directive obligations.
In addition, the supervising authority in each country has issued
determinations and recommendations applicable to the workplace.
V. UNITED KINGDOM

Consistent with the Privacy Directive, the United Kingdom enacted the
Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), which regulates the processing of
personal data. 20 8 The DPA identifies eight personal data protection

200. Id.
201. Article 29 Working Party 2005 document, supra note 196, at 10.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 10.
204. Herbert, No DirectionHome, supra note 188, at 461-66.
205. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.25(1) (West 2008).
206. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-06 (West 2007).
207. See Article 29 Working Party document, supra note 148.
208. Data Protection Act, 1998, C. 29 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/
Acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_1.
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principles as being consistent with the Privacy Directive. 0 9 The DPA
requires that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully
consistent with relevant DPA conditions.
Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified
and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any
manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.
Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive
in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are
processed.
Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept
up to date.
Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall
not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or
those purposes.
Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the
rights of data subjects under this Act.
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be
taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of
personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of,
or damage to, personal data.
Personal data shall not be transferred to a country...
outside the European Economic Area unless that
country .... ensures an adequate level of protection... 20

The United Kingdom's supervisory authority is known as the
" ' In June 2003, pursuant to
Information Commissioner's Office (ICO).21
DPA, section 51, the ICO promulgated the Employment Practices Code.212
The Employment Practices Code is an interpretative guide and does not
constitute an enforceable regulatory framework.213 However, it may be
utilized by the ICO when bringing enforcement proceedings under the
DPA. The Employment Practices Code's primary aim is to provide

209. Id. sched. 1.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Employment Practices Code, http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_
protection/practical-application/coi-html/english/employment-practices-code/about the code.
html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
213. Id
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guidance and recommendations
to employers about the means of
2 14
complying with the DPA.
Part 3 of the Employment Practices Code sets forth the ICO's guidance
and recommendations regarding the application of the DPA to the
implementation of employer monitoring."l5 To ensure compliance with the
DPA, the ICO recommends that before implementing a monitoring system,
an employer should conduct an adverse impact assessment for the purpose
of establishing a balanced program that factors in both the employer's
business needs and the employee privacy interests.216
The ICO identifies certain core principles that must be examined to
ensure a balanced approach to employee monitoring. 217 These principles
include employer recognition that employees have a legitimate expectation
to a degree of privacy in the workplace and that monitoring usually will
intrude on the private lives of employees. 218 Before implementing any
form of monitoring, the ICO recommends that employers fully examine
the purpose for the monitoring and chose the level of monitoring that is
justified for that purpose.2 19 In addition, it recommends that employers
inform employees of the nature, extent, and rationale for any monitoring
except in exceptional situations.22 °
The ICO recommends that an employer's adverse impact assessment
contain five steps:
1.

Identification of the purpose(s) behind the proposed
monitoring and the potential benefits of such monitoring.

2.

Identification of any likely adverse consequences that can
result from the monitoring including: (a) the extent of
intrusion into the private lives of employees with the
recognition that the private lives of employees usually
extend into the workplace; (b) whether employees will
have knowledge of the monitoring and therefore be able to
act to limit any intrusion on their privacy; (c) whether the
monitoring will adversely impact employee morale thereby

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Employment Practices Code, http://www.ico.gov.uldupload/documents/library/data_
protection/practicalapplication/coihtml/english/employment_practices code/part_3-monitorin
g_atwork_1 .html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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disrupting the employer-employee relationship and the
employee-union relationship; and (d) whether monitoring
will impact professional obligations of confidentiality.
3.

Consideration of alternatives to monitoring or the
application of different methods to satisfy the same
purpose as a means of insuring proportionality. Such
considerations can include: (a) implementation of
improved direct supervision, effective training and clear
communications rather than implementing electronic or
other systematic forms of monitoring and targeting the
monitoring only to specific employees who are suspected
of engaging in misconduct.

4.

Recognition and taking into account the employer's
obligations to provide employees with notice of the
monitoring and access to the personal data.

5.

Determining whether the monitoring is justified. To render
this determination, an employer should weigh the
following: (a) the benefits of the method of monitoring; (b)
alternative methods; (c) the balance between the benefits
and the adverse impact; (d) whether the level of intrusion
is absolutely necessary; (e) whether the level of intrusion
into private lives is justifiable by a risk of serious damage
to the employer's enterprise; and (f) whether there has
been consultation with the union or the employees
themselves.221

With respect to monitoring of workplace electronic communications,
such as e-mail and use of the Internet, the ICO recommends that
employers prepare computer use policies that explain: the circumstances
in which an employee may use the employer's equipment for personal
purposes; the extent to which private use is allowed; the restrictions on
materials that may be viewed on the Internet; the level of permissible
personal use when using the employer's computer network while away
from the central workplace; and the purpose of the monitoring or
surveillance.222

221. Employment Practices Code, supra note 216.
222. Id.
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In 2000, the United Kingdom enacted the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which sets forth the legal parameters for the
interception of electronic communications.223 Pursuant to RIPA, sections
4(2) and 78(5), the Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice)
(Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000 were enacted.224 The
regulations identify when it is permissible for an employer to record or
monitor employee e-mail and telephone use without consent.225
Nevertheless, employers remain obligated to comply with the provisions
of the DPA.
In addition to domestic law, ECHR, Article 8 also provides a basis for
challenging employer surveillance. 6 In McGowan v. Scottish Water,27 a
terminated public water company employee, Robert McGowan, argued
that his termination was unlawful because his employer violated ECHR,
Article 8.228 The employer became suspicious that McGowan was
submitting false timesheets, and thus commenced an investigation. 229 The

employer believed that instead of being present at work, McGowan was
spending time at his home, which was located a short distance from the
plant.23 ° Initially, the employer considered installing video surveillance
cameras inside the plant but subsequently rejected the idea as
impractical. 3' Instead, the employer hired a private investigator who
filmed McGowan as he walked between his home and workplace on a
public street.232
In determining that ECHR, Article 8 was not violated, the Scottish
Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded that, although the covert
surveillance impacted McGowan's private and family life, the surveillance
was proportionate because it was aimed at investigating specific employee
misconduct that would constitute a crime. 33 In addition, the tribunal noted

223. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act C. 23 (Eng.), 2000, availableat http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga.20000023_en_1.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (2003),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-Sc9O14916d7a/0/
englishanglais.pdf
227. 2005 IRLR 167 (2004).
228. Id. 1.
229. Id. 3.
230. Id. 4.
231. Id. 3.
232. McGiowan, 2000 IRLR 167, 3.
233. Id. 13.
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that the employer considered and rejected a more intrusive means of
surveillance inside the workplace.234
VI. FRANCE
In France, the Loi Informatique et Libertes (LIL) (the Data Protection
and Liberties Act) and the Code du Travail (Labour Code) constitute the
primary laws applicable to electronic workplace surveillance.235 The
French governmental agency responsible for data privacy protection is the
Commission Nationale de l'Infomatique et des Libertes (CNIL).2 36
Under the Data Protection and Liberties Act, employers must comply
with the principle of transparency and are required to notify CNIL prior to
implementing any form of automatic data collection.237 In addition,
employers must notify employees who are the subject of the data
collection and must inform the employees of their right to access the
data.2 38 The failure to provide proper notice to the CNIL constitutes a
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment and a fine.23 9
In addition, Labour Code L. 120-2 mandates the principle of
proportionality with respect to all forms of employer monitoring. Under
this principle, an employer must have a legitimate objective and must
utilize the least intrusive form of monitoring to accomplish that objective.
Furthermore, Labour Code L. 121-8 requires prior notice to an employee
or job applicant before an employer collects personal information.24 °
234. Id.
235. WLLIAM KELLER, INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 3-16-3-18 (2003).

As NYU's Hauser Global Law School Program has noted, obtaining an English translation of
French case law and statutes can be problematic. Globalex, Research French Law,
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Francel.htm# Case-- English. As a result, my discussion
of French law, by necessity, is based upon secondary sources.
236. Cyber-Surveillance in the Workplace, CNIL Report (Feb. 5, 2002) (containing various
non-binding recommendations), available at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/uk/CNILcybersurveillance-feb2002-VA.pdf.
237. CNIL has published a decree identified the means for providing it with notification and
for requesting a CNIL opinion. Decree No. 2005-1309 of 20 October 2005, as amended, available
at http://www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/uk/DecreeNo2005-1309.pdf.
238. KELLER, supra note 235, at 3-16-3-17.
239. For example, in April 2007, Tyco Healthcare was fined more than $40,000 for failing to
comply with CNIL's repeated requests for a more detailed description of the company's employee
data collection database. Philip L. Gordon et al., French DataProtectionAuthority Fires Warning
Shot to U.S. Multinationals:US.-Base Employer Finedfor Improper Transferof Employee Data
to the U.S., LITTLER BLOGS, May 2007, http://www.littler.com/presspublications/Lists/ASAPs/
DispAsaps.aspx?id--974&asapType=ntemational%20Employent%/o20and%2Labor%/o2OLaw
240. KELLER, supra note 235, at 3-16.
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Finally, Labour Code L. 431-2-1 requires that an employer inform and
consult with the Works Council prior to implementing a system of
technological monitoring. 24 ' The failure to engage in such consultation is
subject to criminal sanctions.242
In Nikon Francev. FredericOnof,243 a French appellate court sustained
an employee's wrongful termination suit on the grounds that the employer
violated the employee's rights under ECHR, Article 8 and French Labour
Code L. 120-2 when it obtained and read the employee's explicitly labeled
personal e-mail stored on its hard drive. 2 " In reaching its holding, the
French Supreme Court stated:
The employee has the right, even during working hours and at his
workplace, to the respect of his privacy; this includes in particular
the confidentiality of his correspondence; the employer cannot,
without infringing this fundamental liberty, examine the personal
messages sent or received by the employee on a computer tool
placed at his disposal for work, and this even in the case of the
employer having prohibited a non-professional use of the
computer.245
In 2005, the same French appellate court decided Philippe X v.
246 In PhilippeX, the court reversed a judgment in favor
Cathnet-Science.
of an employer who had terminated an employee for maintaining
pornographic images in a computer file marked "personal" on the
employer's computer. 247 The appellate court concluded that, in the absence
of particular risk or event, an employer cannot access a computer file that
an employee has labeled as personal.248
This Article next discusses the privacy laws in Canada, the final nation
under consideration. Although Canada is not a Member State of the

241. Id. at 3-16-3-17.
242. Id. at 3-17.
243. MATrHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY INEMPLOYMENT LAW ch.5.III(B)(4), at 288-89 (2d ed.
2008).
244. Id
245. Lasprogata et al., supra note 27, 53 (quoting from a translation of Nikon France v.
Frederic Onut).
246. Cour de Cassation, Cass.soc., May 17,2005, Arret No. 1089 FS-P+B+R+ 1, Pourvoi No.
J-03-40.017.
247. Fred H. Cate, EuropeanCourt ofHuman Rights Expands PrivacyProtections:Copland
v. United Kingdom, 11 ASIL INSIGHTS, Aug. 6, 2007, available at http://www.asil.org/
insights070806.cfm.
248. Id.
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European Union, it has been proactive, on the national and provincial
levels, in the field of electronic privacy.
VII. CANADA
In 2000, Canada enacted the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) in direct response to the EU Privacy
Directive.249 PIPEDA establishes legal protections with respect to the
collection and use of personal data by employers in the Canadian
federally-regulated sector such as telecommunications, banking, aviation,
interprovincial or international trucking.25 °
Prior to enacting PIPEDA, Canada had enacted the Federal Privacy
Act, which protects the privacy of personal information of employees
employed by the Canadian federal government. 1
In drafting PIPEDA, the Canadian Parliament incorporated, the ten
privacy principles established by the Canadian Standards Association in
its Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information:
1.

2.

3.

Accountability: an organization must designate an
individual who is responsible for ensuring compliance with
the principles and must create policies and practices to give
effect to the principles, including establishing procedures
for complaints and inquiries and the training of staff
regarding the policies and training.
Identifying Purpose: an organization must identify the
purpose(s) for collecting the personal information at or
before the time of collection of the data and inform the
individual of the purpose at or before requesting the
information. The collection, use or disclosure of personal
information is permitted only for purposes that a
reasonable person would consider appropriate in the
circumstances.
Consent: in general, an individual's knowledge and
consent are required for the collection, use and
dissemination of personal information. PIPEDA permits

249. PIPEDA, R.S.C., ch. 5 (2000), availableathttp://www.privcom.gc.ca/legislation/02 06
0101 e.asp.
250. PIPEDA and Provincial Private Sector Privacy Laws, www.privatech.ca/privacylaws/canada/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
251. Federal Privacy Act, R.S.C. ch. P-21 (1985), availableat http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/
showdoc/cs/P-2 l///en?page=l.
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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

consent to be obtained by various means and consent can
be withdrawn at any time.
Limiting Collection: personal information can be collected
only for the purpose(s) necessary identified by the
organization and by fair and lawful means. The amount
and type of information collected must be proportionate to
the purposes identified. Therefore, collection cannot be
indiscriminate.
Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention: the personal
information collected cannot be used or disclosed for a
purpose other than that originally identified by the
organization without the consent of the individual.
Accuracy: collected personal information must be as
accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the
purpose(s) for which it is collected and used. Routine
updating of personal information is prohibited unless it is
necessary to fulfill the purpose(s) for which it is collected.
Safeguards: an organization must establish security
safeguards to protect personal information against loss or
theft, as well as unauthorized access, disclosure, copying,
use, or modification.
Openness: specific organizational policies and practices
with respect to the management of personal information
must be both reasonably available and generally
understandable.
Individual Access: Upon request, an individual is entitled
to know the existence, use, and disclosure of his or her
personal information; have access to the information; and
be allowed to challenge the accuracy and completeness of
the information; and have it modified as appropriate.
Challenging compliance: Organizations are required to
establish procedures for complaints or inquiries relating to
the handling of personal information. 2

Canada has established a federal agency, the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner (OPC). The OPC is an independent government office with
the power to investigate complaints under PIPEDA and the Federal
Privacy Act and to commence court litigation to enforce federal privacy

252. IPEDA, R.S.C., ch. 5, sched. 1, §§ 4.14.10.4 (2000).
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protections.253 The OPC also plays an important role in analyzing the
privacy implications of new technologies in employment such as
biometrics, GPS, and RFID.
In 2004, the OPC dismissed a complaint filed by employees alleging
that their privacy rights were violated when an employer required them to
provide a biometric voice print for logging work-related information.254
The purpose of the system was to permit field employees to log in and
authenticate themselves in a cost-effective manner. 5 The OPC concluded
that the biometric voice print, used solely for an individual
employee's authentication, constituted a fairly benign privacy intrusion
and satisfied the reasonable purpose requirement under PIEPDA" 6
Subsequently, the OPC issued a report dismissing a complaint against
an employer for using GPS technology. It, however, expressed concerns
that data obtained may violate privacy rights when job performance is
evaluated based upon employer assumptions stemming from that
electronic data. 7 More recently, OPC issued a preliminary consultation
paper, entitled Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the Workplace:
Recommendations for Good Practices, which recommends ten privacy
principles applicable to the use of RFID technology in the workplace.258
In addition, many Canadian provinces have enacted their own privacy
laws applicable to the private sector employment context. Some of these
laws create a provisional privacy commissioner with the power to
investigate and prosecute complaints of workplace privacy violations and
to study and report on privacy issues. For example, British Columbia's
Personal Information Protection Act, section 13,259 defines when a private
employer may collect employee personal information. The provision
permits employers to collect employee personal information without
consent if the "collection is reasonable for the purposes of establishing,

253. Id.ch. 5, §§ 11-17 (2000); Federal Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P-21, § 29 (1985).
254. Commissioner's Findings, PIPEDA Case Summary#281, OrganizationUses Biometrics
forAuthenticationPurposes,availableat http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/2004/cf-dc_040903_e.
asp.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Commissioner's Findings, PIPEDA Case Summary #351, Use of PersonalInformation
Collected by Global PositioningSystem Considered,available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cfdc/2006/351_20061109_e. asp.
258. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
in the Workplace: Recommendations for Good Practices: A Consultation Paper, Mar. 2008,
availableat http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/pub/rfid-e.asp#Part2.
259. British Columbia's Personal Information Privacy Act, B.C.R. 473, § 13 (2003), available
at www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/P/03063_01.htm.
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managing or terminating an employment relationship between the
organization and the individual., 260 However, an employer is required to
provide notice to the employee that the information is being collected
along with information about the purpose for the collection.261
Similarly, Alberta's Personal Information Protection Act, section 15,
provides that an employer can collect personal information without
individual consent if the individual is an employee or if the information is
for the purpose of recruiting a potential employee.262 However, the
collection of personal information about an employee must be reasonable
in light of the purpose for which it is being collected and must be related
to the employment relationship.263 Under Alberta law, employees must be
given reasonable notification that the information is going to be collected
and must be advised of the purpose for the data collection.2 4
VII. CONCLUSION
A review of developments abroad in the area of electronic workplace
privacy law demonstrates that the United States is far behind in studying
the implications of the technological transformation of the workplace and
acting to establish an enforceable balance between respective workplace
interests. Despite the ever-widening gap between the public perception and
the legal reality of privacy rights in the American workplace, there has
been little movement on the federal, state and local levels in this area. The
recent enactment of GINA, following years of federal study into the issue
of genetic discrimination, is a hopeful sign that the reign of deregulation
ideology may be ending.
The lack of American initiative in developing a nuanced approach to
workplace privacy in the face of new technologies is strikingly
inconsistent with the leadership that the United States has previously
provided in the field of privacy. Over a century ago, it was Louis Brandeis
and his law partner Samuel Warren who famously advocated in the
Harvard Law Review for the recognition of a common law right to
privacy. 265 Their article, along with other forces, precipitated some states

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Alberta's Personal Information Protection Act, A.R., ch. P-65, § 15 (2003).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Samuel L. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890). A few decades later, in his dissenting opinion in Olmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
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to recognize a common law right to privacy. In our own time, it remains
to be seen what will precipitate a meaningful societal discussion aimed at
establishing a reasonable legal framework for the contemporary American
workplace that balances the respective interests and rights of employers
and employees.
As we have seen, the European Union, the United Kingdom, France,
and Canada have all moved swiftly to establish legal infrastructures aimed
at responding to the privacy implications of the computer-based
technological revolution. These infrastructures have resulted in reports,
opinions, and decisions that establish similar approaches to privacy issues
in the electronic workplace. It is probable that the administrative structures
and analyses developed abroad may provide helpful guidance as the
United States develops its own public policy that goes beyond its heavy
reliance on employer self-regulation.

478 (1928), then Justice Brandies argued in favor of a right to privacy emanating from the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

